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Introduction
What does the average employee ponder as she approaches the
photocopy machine? Hope that it will not be jammed? What she is
going to eat for lunch that day? The possibility of defending a large-
scale copyright infringement lawsuit by a major publisher? Although
it may appear ludicrous, this final contemplation is not as exaggerated
as it seems in light of a landmark copyright case decided in October of
1994.
In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,' the Second Cir-
cuit ensured that thousands of private corporations throughout the
United States are in for a rude shock. Photocopying practices that
used to be considered reasonable and customary will now expose
companies to infringement liability unless businesses re-evaluate their
photocopying practices and implement methods advocated by the
court. If this ruling stands, the practice of carefree photocopying so
prevalent in private organizations today will become a distant
memory.2
The fact pattern of Texaco would be frighteningly familiar to any
corporate employee. Dr. Donald H. Chickering, a chemical engineer-
ing researcher at Texaco, copied eight articles from a scientific journal,
The Journal of Catalysis, and placed the copies in his files for later
reference.' The photocopies were made solely for Dr. Chickering's
personal use and were never circulated or distributed. Despite the
seemingly innocuous nature of this activity, the Second Circuit, in a
two-to-one decision authored by Chief Judge Newman, upheld the
district court's ruling that the copying constituted copyright infringe-
ment.4 The Texaco case has tested the parameters of photocopying by
for-profit institutions, and copying like Dr. Chickering's, even if done
to advance science and not directly related to commercial benefit, has
fallen outside those parameters.
1. 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3788 (U.S. Apr. 24,
1995) (No. 94-1726).
2. The decision is especially influential because the Second Circuit is widely recog-
nized as an authority on copyright law.
3. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 883. This litigation began as a class action suit brought by the
American Geophysical Union and 82 other publishers of scientific journals. To streamline
discovery and simplify the suit, the parties stipulated that the case would focus on the
photocopying practices of one Texaco researcher, and subsequently chose Dr. Donald
Chickering at random.
4. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 899, affirming Judge Pierre N. Leval's ruling for the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. American Geophysical Union
v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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This Note argues that the Texaco result is contrary to the original
purpose of the 1976 Copyright Act 5 and subject to many criticisms.
However, this Note also recognizes that despite its weaknesses, the
case could signify a new era in copyright law and will likely become
potent fair use precedent. Part I provides a brief overview of the
Copyright Act with emphasis on the "fair use" and library exceptions
to the Act's exclusive rights. Part II reviews and critiques the Texaco
decision as well as its impassioned dissent. Part III examines the
Copyright Clearance Center,6 an organization which facilitates com-
pliance with copyright law and on which the Second Circuit relied
heavily in deciding that Texaco had reasonable alternatives to com-
pensate Catalysis' publishers. Finally, Part IV predicts the future legal
direction of corporate photocopying and proposes methods to ensure
that future scientific research by private entities is not stifled by over-
zealous application of copyright law.
I
The 1976 Copyright Act
The United States Constitution empowers Congress "to promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries."' 7 Under this authority, Congress enacted the first
federal copyright statute in 1790.8 Since then, Congress has amended
the copyright law numerous times. The most recent revision, passed
in 1976, was prompted by two main catalysts: technical advancements
in document reproduction which required a new approach to copy-
right law; and the United States' need to synchronize with interna-
tional copyright law.9
Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants copyright holders an exclusive
"bundle of rights" to reproduce and distribute their works. 10 Gener-
ally, anyone seeking to undertake any of the activities protected by
5. Copyright Law of the United States of America, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (codifying
Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (Oct. 19, 1976) and the amendments thereto).
6. 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, Massachusetts 01923.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
9. LAURA N. GASAWAY & SARAH K. WIANT, LIBRARIES AND COPYRIGHT: A GUIDE
TO COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE 1990's 17 (1994).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-62 (1975) [hereinafter HOUSE RE-
PORT]. Specifically, section 106 grants copyright owners the right to: (1) reproduce the
work in copies or photocopies; (2) prepare derivative works; (3) distribute copies or photo-
copies publicly; (4) perform the work publicly; and (5) display the work publicly. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (Supp. IV 1992).
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section 106 must first obtain permission from the copyright holder to
avoid liability for copyright infringement.
A. Section 107
Although the copyright holder's rights under the Act are exclu-
sive, there are some exceptions, including the doctrine of "fair use,"
11
which is the primary issue in the Texaco case. Codified for the first
time under section 107 of the Act, fair use is a judicially created doc-
trine which allows reasonable use of copyrighted materials in limited
situations.12 Section 107 defines fair use as "reproduction for pur-
poses of criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or
research," and lists four factors to be weighed in a determination of
fair use: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the taking; and
(4) the effect on the value and potential market value of the original.13
These factors are not exclusive, and Congress intended for courts to
apply the doctrine on a case by case basis, taking individual equitable
and factual considerations into account. 14 The primary goal of fair use
is to ensure that copyright law does not impede learning, scientific and
cultural advancement, or dissemination of valuable factual and artistic
materials to the public at large.' 5 However, the broad language of the
doctrine leaves it open to abuse, and the fact-intensive nature of the
inquiry prevents the formation of a cohesive framework of rules for
courts and potential infringers to follow. The intricacies of the fair use
doctrine will be addressed more fully in Part III's discussion of the
Texaco opinion.
B. Section 108
Another relevant exception to the Copyright Act's exclusive
rights is section 108, commonly referred to as the "library excep-
tion.""6 Although the Texaco parties stipulated to litigate the case
solely under the fair use doctrine, the opinion mentions section 108,17
and it is reasonable to speculate that Texaco's failure to address the
exception more fully might elicit substantial criticism.' 8 Moreover, it
11. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. IV 1992).
12. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 65.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
14. HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 65.
15. GASAWAY & WIANT, supra note 9, at 26.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (Supp. IV 1992).
17. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 886, 899.
18. For example, in his 1988 report to Congress, the Register of Copyrights speculated
that the then recently filed Texaco case would "result in a definitive interpretation" of
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is relevant to explore the applicability of this section to photocopying
by corporate libraries because it has sparked much debate among
commentators. 19
Section 108 provides exemption from copyright liability for li-
brary copying in limited circumstances, and its protections are given
"in addition to those conferred by section 107. ''2° Exemption from
liability is quite specific under section 108, and does not require a case
by case determination. It allows libraries to make no more than one
copy of a copyrighted piece if statutory requirements are fulfilled, but
specifically prohibits "systematic" copying.2' The library exemption
comes at a price, however, as it is quite difficult for many libraries to
qualify for section 108.
To benefit from section 108's protection, three requirements must
be met. First, reproduction or distribution must be made without the
purpose of any "direct or indirect" commercial advantage.22
Although legislative history reflects that corporate libraries would
probably be excluded by this requirement,23 there is equally persua-
sive authority for the proposition that the "advantage" referred to in
the clause refers to immediate commercial advantage, rather than inci-
dental commercial advantage as presented in the Texaco case.24 In an
attempt to resolve this debate, Congress' Conference Committee
§ 108. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: LIBRARY REPRODUCTION OF COPY-
RIGHTED WORKS (17 U.S.C. § 108) 53 (1988) [hereinafter REGISTER'S 1988 REPORT]. Un-
fortunately, Texaco failed to address this issue, and judicial interpretation of § 108's
applicability to the private sector remains lacking.
19. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 74-75; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 67 (1975) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; REGISTER'S 1988 REPORT, supra note 18, at
49-53; REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: LIBRARY REPRODUCTION OF COPY-
RIGHTED WORKS (17 U.S.C. § 108) 80-84 (1983) [hereinafter REGISTER'S 1983 REPORT].
20. Randall Coyne, Rights of Reproduction and the Provision of Library Services, 13
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 485, 502 (1991).
21. SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 70.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1994).
23. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 19:
'[W]ithout any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage' is intended to
preclude a library or archives in a profit-making organization from providing pho-
tocopies of copyrighted material to employees engaged in furtherance of the or-
ganization's commercial enterprise, unless such copying qualifies as a fair use, or
the organization has obtained the necessary copyright licenses.
Id. at 67.
24. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 75:
These activities, by themselves, would ordinarily not be considered 'for direct or
indirect commercial advantage,' since the 'advantage' referred to in this clause
must attach to the immediate commercial motivation behind the reproduction or
distribution itself, rather than to the ultimate profit-making motivation behind
the enterprise in which the library is located.
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stated that as long as the other two prerequisites of section 108 are
met (discussed below), an organization would not be excluded from
section 108 protection solely because of its commercial nature.25
Thus, it is not entirely clear to what extent the "direct or indirect com-
mercial advantage" requirement of section 108 excludes private
businesses.
Second, section 108 mandates that the library be open to the pub-
lic or available to unaffiliated researchers working in that particular
field.26 It is obviously quite easy for public and university libraries to
satisfy this; thus, like the first requirement of section 108, most of the
debate centers on for-profit libraries. In his 1983 report to Congress,
the Register of Copyrights noted that most corporations cannot satisfy
this standard because to do so would force them to open up their re-
sources to competitors in their fields.27 However, library associations
argue that libraries in private organizations can meet this requirement
by giving other libraries (rather than outside researchers) access to
their collections through interlibrary loans or visiting rights, reducing
the competitive threat.28 To date, there are no cases or legislative ma-
terial that address this issue.
Third, section 108 requires that the reproduction or distribution
of the photocopied work include a notice of copyright.29 It seems ob-
vious that a corporate employee engaged in isolated photocopying of
books or journals for future reference would not think to affix a notice
of copyright to the reproduction. However, a corporation that is cog-
nizant of copyright law and consciously trying to qualify for section
108 protection would probably educate its employees about this re-
quirement as well as the first two. Thus, placing a notice of copyright
on reproductions would be easy once the first two hurdles of section
108 are met.
Finally, it is important to note that even if a private library meets
the three prerequisites, section 108's general requirement that the
25. CONF. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 73-74 (1976) [hereinafter CONFERENCE
REPORT].
26. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
27. REGISTER'S 1983 REPORT, supra note 19, at 78. As enacted in 1976, section 108(i)
required the Register of Copyrights to submit a report to Congress every five years, focus-
ing on "the extent to which this section has achieved the intended statutory balancing of
the rights of creators, and the needs of users." In accordance with this, the Register sub-
mitted reports in 1983 and 1988. In 1992, however, the reporting requirement was re-
pealed because Congress and then Register Ralph Oman determined that the intended
statutory balance had been achieved. Copyright Report to Congress, 17 U.S.C. § 108(i),
repealed by Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, § 301, 17 U.S.C. § 108 (Supp. IV 1992).
28. GASAWAY & WIANT, supra note 9, at 45.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
19951
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
copying be isolated further removes most corporations from section
108. This is because courts can interpret the clause as allowing no
more than one copy per user (i.e. per corporation), as the district court
in Texaco did,3° rather than allowing no more than one copy per em-
ployee, which would permit multiple instances of photocopying by dif-
ferent employees within a company. Also, legislative history indicates
that the isolated copying requirement of section 108 precludes copying
more than one article from a particular journal, or more than one por-
tion from a particular book,31 which is common in corporations. Nev-
ertheless, some experts still maintain that section 108 allows copying
by for-profit entities so long as the copying is not accompanied by
immediate commercial motivation.32
In his 1988 report to Congress, the Register of Copyrights pre-
dicted that the Texaco case would answer the question of whether for-
profit libraries qualify for section 108. 33 Unfortunately for businesses,
if the Texaco decision stands, the answer appears to be "no." The
district court flatly rejected Texaco's argument that it was entitled to
section 108 protection,34 and the Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court without considering the issue. Given this, the chance that corpo-
rate libraries qualify for the library exemption seems questionable at
best, and de minimis at worst.
C. The Relationship Between Section 107 and 108
Section 108 unequivocally states that its provisions do not affect
or limit the protections offered by Section 107 in any way.35 Thus,
although few corporate libraries qualify for section 108 treatment,
they can still argue that their photocopying constitutes fair use.
Although both sections offer possible copyright exemption to for-
profit libraries, they are distinct in two important ways. First, fair use
under section 107 is available to any defendant able to prove that the
four statutory factors weigh in its favor. By contrast, a party must be a
semi-public or public library to invoke section 108. Second, fair use is
an exception to all of the exclusive rights bestowed by the Copyright
Act, but section 108 allows qualifying parties only to reproduce and
distribute copyrighted works.36 In sum, private libraries should recog-
nize that if their conduct does not fall within the narrow confines of
30. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 28.
31. SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 68.
32. GASAWAY & WIANT, supra note 9, at 61.
33. REGISTER'S 1988 REPORT, supra note 18, at 53.
34. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 27-28.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (Supp. IV 1992).
36. Coyne, supra note 20, at 511.
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section 108, section 107 still offers a possible defense to infringement
liability.
II
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco
A. Relevant Case Law
1. Non-binding fair use cases
Since the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, there has been a
wealth of Supreme Court fair use cases addressing issues such as un-
authorized publication of book excerpts, 37 home video recording of
televised films, 38 reproduction of copyrighted works by copy shops for
course anthologies,39 and unauthorized parodies of copyrighted
songs.40 However, there is no Supreme Court precedent applying the,
1976 Act to the extraordinarily common practice of internal corporate
photocopying as presented in the Texaco case.
Although publishers other than the Texaco plaintiffs have chal-
lenged the photocopying practices of corporations, these disputes
either ended in settlement or distinguishable trial court decisions,
leaving the courts with sparse guidance for future resolution of analo-
gous cases. For example, in the early 1980s, Harper & Row publishers
filed separate lawsuits against the E.R. Squibb Company41 and the
American Cyanamid Company.42 Both suits alleged that the corpora-
tions had infringed on Harper & Row's copyright by making unau-
thorized photocopies of journal articles.43 Subsequently, Washington
Business Information, Inc. filed a similar suit, indicating that publish-
ers will aggressively protect their copyrights." That case involved al-
37. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
38. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
39. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
40. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
41. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Squibb, Co., No. 82-2363 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
42. Harper & Row, Publishers v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 81-7813 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
43. In both cases, Harper & Row's chief complaint was that the journals photocopied
by the defendants were registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC). The settle-
ments required Squibb and American Cyanamid to register as users of the CCC and pay
Harper & Row directly for photocopies made from journals not registered with the CCC.
These cases were a precursor to Texaco as they foreshadowed the overwhelming impor-
tance courts would place on the existence of the CCC when deciding corporate photocopy-
ing cases. For a more complete discussion of the CCC and its relevance to the Texaco
decision, see infra, Parts II(b)(2)(d) and III.
44. Washington Business Info., Inc. v. Collier, Shannon & Scott, No. CA 91-0305-A
(D.Va. filed Feb. 26, 1991) (cited in ARLENE BIELEFIELD & LAWRENCE CHEESEMAN, Li-
BRARIES AND COPYRIGHT LAW 101 (1993)).
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leged systematic photocopying of a newsletter by a law firm. What
frightened private librarians was not the circumstances surrounding
the case, however, but the fact that the publisher of the newsletter
offered a reward to anyone who provided proof of illegal copying.45
Like the Harper & Row cases, this action settled out of court, but the
reward tactic employed by the plaintiff drove home the point that
copyright infringement is a serious federal crime.46
Other than Texaco, only two corporate photocopying cases have
rendered published decisions: Pasha Publications v. Enmark Gas
Corp.47 and Television Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Telephone Ass'n,48 both of
which rejected the fair use defense. Although unauthorized copies in
both cases were made solely for the defendants' employees, the pho-
tocopies were made specifically for systematic distribution to person-
nel and did not facilitate research, thus presenting much more
compelling infringement cases than Texaco. Consequently, instructive
precedent is sparse for subtle and complex photocopying cases like
Texaco.
2. The Williams & Wilkins decision
Though not directly on point, the closest factual equivalent to the
Texaco case that rendered a published opinion is Williams & Wilkins
Co. v. United States,49 which was decided by a divided United States
Court of Claims in 1973, and affirmed by an equally divided Supreme
Court in 1975.50 Although Williams & Wilkins was decided three
years prior to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, it was adjudi-
cated under the common law fair use doctrine, and involved library
photocopying of scientific journals. Therefore, it continues to hold the
force of precedent and was cited by Texaco in its defense before the
Second Circuit.5'
In 1968, the William & Wilkins Company, publisher of thirty-
seven medical journals, sued the library of the National Institute of
Health (NIH) and the National Library of Medicine (NLM). The
publisher claimed that the libraries infringed its copyrights by making
unauthorized photocopies of articles contained in its journals.52 Both
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 22 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1076 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (defendant was a natural gas distributor).
48. 841 F. Supp. 5 (D.D.C. 1993) (defendant was a trade association).
49. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
50. 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
51. Brief for Texaco at 21, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 37 F.3d 881 (2d
Cir. 1994) (No. 92-9341).
52. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1346.
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libraries ran photocopy services. The NIH served only its research
staff, while the NLM served government agencies, private organiza-
tions, and other libraries. They limited their photocopying, however,
to under fifty pages of a single journal article per request.5 3
By a four to three vote, the Court of Claims reversed the trial
court and found that the libraries' photocopying practices constituted
fair use. 4 The court identified four main reasons for its decision.
First, and most importantly, both libraries were non-profit organiza-
tions "devoted solely to the advancement and dissemination of medi-
cal knowledge.- 55  Second, the libraries strictly limited their
employees' photocopying practices.56 Third, the court recognized that
library photocopying had been a common practice since the enact-
ment of the first Copyright Act in 1909.17 Finally, even as conceded
by the *plaintiffs, the court felt that medical science and research would
be seriously harmed by a finding of infringement.58 Other relevant
considerations were that the publisher was not harmed by the photo-
copying because it was still making a profit,59 and the court's belief
that since Congress was at the time debating what would become the
1976 Copyright Act, it was more prudent to maintain the status quo
until Congress spoke on the issue.6°
The Williams & Wilkins decision evoked two stinging dissenting
opinions and harsh criticism from commentators who feared that the
decision essentially emasculated copyright protection in cases where
the photocopying could be characterized as research-oriented. 6' One
dissent went so far as to label the decision "the Dred Scott decision of
copyright law."'62 However, these fears never materialized because
several of the bases for the liberal decision have disappeared since
1973. One major change was the enactment of the 1976 Copyright
Act, which clearly tried to limit future liberal application of the fair
use doctrine.63 Another was significant advancement in photocopying
53. Id. at 1347-48.
54. Id. at 1362.
55. Id. at 1354.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1355.
58. Id. at 1356.
59. Id. at 1357-58.
60. Id. at 1360-61. The court even characterized its resolution of the case as a hold
over decision.
61. WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 182 (1985).
62. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1387.
63. GASAWAY & WIANT, supra note 9, at 60. Some writers feel the Act essentially
reversed the Williams & Wilkins decision. See WILLIAM F. PARRY, LATMAN'S THE COPY-
RIGHT LAW 245 (6th ed. 1986).
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and electronic copying technology which increased the threat of copy-
right infringement and made enforcement by publishers very diffi-
cult.64 The last, and most relevant, development to the Texaco court
was the formation of licensing organizations such as the Copyright
Clearance Center, which provide streamlined methods for users to
pay publishers for photocopies without having to contact them
directly.
Despite these developments, there has been no on-point Supreme
Court precedent since William & Wilkins. Until the Supreme Court
decides another photocopying case, courts will continue to cite Wil-
liam & Wilkins despite vast changes in corporate photocopying prac-
tices over the last twenty years.
B. The Texaco Decision
1. Procedural Background and Facts
Texaco employs hundreds of scientists and technicians at its re-
search facilities and subscribes to numerous scientific and technical
journals. Like most corporations, Texaco receives one or a few copies
of each journal which it circulates to employees before permanently
placing the issues in its library. Texaco employees customarily photo-
copy articles of interest for their personal reference and research.65
In 1985, American Geophysical Union and eighty-two other pub-
lishers sued Texaco for copyright infringement. Although Texaco sub-
scribed to the Copyright Clearance Center (the "CCC") 6 6 and paid
royalties to publishers through the CCC for some of its photocopies,
the plaintiffs alleged that these payments vastly undercompensated
them for the amount of copying actually done at Texaco.67 Because
fair use was Texaco's principal defense, and the resolution of that
claim would be dispositive to the action, the parties stipulated to liti-
gate the case solely under section 107. Accordingly, the case focused
on one Texaco researcher chosen at random, Dr. Donald H. Chicker-
ing, II, and his photocopying of one scientific journal, The Journal of
Catalysis.68
Dr. Chickering is a chemical engineer who, in accordance with
customary practice at Texaco, photocopied eight articles from Cataly-
sis and placed them in his files for future reference and laboratory
64. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[E][1] (1994) [hereinafter
NIMMER].
65. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 884.
66. For a full discussion of the CCC, see infra section III.
67. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 4.
68. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 883.
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use.69 The record reflects that he made the photocopies solely, to facil-
itate his research, and did not circulate or distribute any of them. Dr.
Chickering made no more than one copy of each of the articles in
question.7 °
In a comprehensive opinion, Judge Pierre N. Leval7 of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that Dr. Chickering's photocopying did not constitute fair use.72
Judge Leval concluded that three of the four factors enumerated in
section 107 weighed in favor of the plaintiffs, and rejected Texaco's
equitable arguments.73 Upon its ruling, the court granted Texaco's
motion for an immediate appeal to the Second Circuit.
2. The Four Fair Use Factors of Section 107
The doctrine of fair use is an "equitable rule of reason" which
requires courts to balance the four statutory factors, as well as con-
sider the equitable elements of each case.74 The Second Circuit's
analysis of the statutory factors differed slightly from Judge Leval's,
but the court ultimately agreed that Texaco's photocopying consti-
tuted unlawful copyright infringement.7 5
a. First Factor: The Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor to be considered under the fair use doctrine is the
purpose and character of the use. 76 Although a commercial use of
copyrighted material creates a presumption of unfair use, 77 this pre-
sumption can be rebutted by a showing that the use is beneficial to
society.78
Texaco advanced three main arguments regarding the first factor.
Texaco first asserted that legislative history indicated that courts
should focus on the character and purpose of the use, which they
claimed was research and science, rather than the commercial motiva-
69. Id. at 884.
70. Brief for Texaco, supra note 51, at 10-11.
71. Judge Leval is considered an expert in the field of copyright law. See Gloria C.
Phares, The Unlicensed Photocopying of Copyrighted Works: 'Texaco' Deals Blow to For-
Profit Businesses, 4 No. 9 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 11 (1992).
72. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 28.
73. Id. For a detailed analysis of the district court decision, see Phares, supra note 71.
74. Sony, 464 U.S. at 448.
75. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 899.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
77. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-51.
78. See Maxtone Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987).
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tion behind the enterprise in which the photocopying takes place.79
Texaco argued ihat "Judge Leval erred in focusing on Texaco's ulti-
mate profit-making goal [rather than] the immediate scientific re-
search purpose of a scientist's copying of eight scholarly articles."8
Texaco also argued that the court ignored the important role copying
like Dr. Chickering's plays in furthering the Copyright Act's goal of
"promoting the progress of science and useful arts."81
The Second Circuit agreed that Texaco's actual use of the copy-
righted work deserved consideration, and that Texaco's status as a for-
profit corporation was not dispositive of the first factor. In fact, the
court conceded that Judge Leval overemphasized Texaco's commer-
cial nature.82 However, the court concluded that although the link
between Dr. Chickering's copying and Texaco's profit was attenuated,
Texaco should be obligated to make some compensation to the copy-
right owners because the copying constituted a "factor in
production."83
Although the court conceded that Texaco's photocopying was pri-
marily non-commercial, and that it served a broader public interest
than profit, the opinion did not grant these findings the import they
deserved. The weight of fair use authority holds that the commercial
nature of the use is a highly important consideration under the first
factor.' However, even after recognizing that the commercial value
of Dr. Chickering's copies was de minimis at best, the court inferred
that this finding did not hurt Texaco, but that it did not help Texaco
either. The court did not, as it should have, view the non-commercial
use as a major factor in favor of Texaco. Although the commercial
nature of the use is not dispositive under section 107, a use of merely
"attenuated" commercial value, such as the use presented in this case,
deserved far greater deference by the court than it received.
The second argument advanced by Texaco centered on the
"transformative" nature of Dr. Chickering's copies. Courts have held
that a "transformative" use (one that alters the nature of the original
and generates a new and useful product) weighs in favor of a finding
of fair use.85 Texaco conceded that photocopying is not transforma-
tive, per se, but argued that a non-transformative use is only unfair
79. Brief for Texaco, supra note 51, at 16-18.
80. Id. at 17.
81. Id. at 21 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
82. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 889.
83. Id. at 890.
84. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562; Sony, 464 U.S. at 449; TWin Peaks Prods.,
Inc., v. Publications Int'l Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1374 (2d Cir. 1993).
85. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171.
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when the product competes with the original work.86 Thus, because
the copies were not sold or distributed, and because "Dr. Chickering
wanted a copy ... because it enabled him to take materials into the
laboratory and avoid mistakes in taking notes regarding ... complex
calculations," Texaco argued that the use was fair.
In response, the court agreed that the transformative nature of
the use is a key factor, but found that the photocopies were neither
productive nor transformative because their purpose was identical to
the purpose of the original-to have the article available for easy ref-
erence."8 The opinion characterized the copying as predominantly
"archival" because the duplicates were created and stored so that Tex-
aco would not have to pay for additional subscriptions. 89 The court
noted that if the dominant purpose of the photocopy had been to pre-
vent damage to the original in the lab, the first fair use factor may
have favored Texaco. 90 However, the court found that preventing
damage was merely an incidental purpose of the copies. 91 The court
found no transformative use because, although the activity furthered
research, it added no new intellectual value to the original.92
Texaco's final argument was that the type of photocopying per-
formed by Dr. Chickering was "extremely widespread ... reasonable
and customary."93 Texaco criticized Judge Leval's finding that the
existence of the CCC changed what used to be considered reasonable
and customary by providing users with a convenient way to pay pub-
lishers for copies. Texaco claimed that there was no evidence indicat-
ing that the CCC has changed companies' individual photocopying
practices, and asserted that just because "the publishers wish to
change the custom and practice, and are seeking to use this lawsuit to
do so, does not mean that what has occurred for decades is no longer
reasonable or customary, and hence unfair." 9
86. Brief for Texaco, supra note 51, at 23 (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), and Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d
832 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
87. Id. at 24-25. Texaco compared Chickering's photocopying to the "time-shifting"
use of home video recording in the Sony case, which the Supreme Court found fair because
the copy was filed away for use at a later date, and thus did not compete with the original.
Id. at 25.
88. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 891.
89. Id. at 887-88.
90. Id. at 887.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 891.
93. Brief for Texaco, supra note 51, at 26.
94. Id. at 27-28.
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The court flatly rejected Texaco's arguments concerning the CCC.
It held that the copying was not reasonable and customary because
the CCC has provided workable methods to obtain photocopy
licenses.95 Although Texaco's argument has merit, the court's flat re-
jection seems to indicate that, through this decision, the Second Cir-
cuit is attempting to redefine what will be considered reasonable and
customary in the future. The court probably recognized that most
businesses regularly engage in precisely the kind of carefree photo-
copying exemplified by this case, but the decision's easy rejection of
this reality sends a message that the "reasonable and customary" prac-
tice of the future will involve corporations habitually obtaining
licenses for all photocopies, regardless of their scope or purpose.
Based on the above findings, the court concluded that the first
factor weighed against a finding of fair use.96
b. Second Factor: The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second statutory factor is the nature of the copyrighted
work.97 The accepted rule is that reproduction of factual works is far
more likely to constitute fair use than reproduction of creative
works.98 Given the undisputed fact that the photocopied articles were
factual, the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Leval's finding that the sec-
ond fair use factor decidedly favored Texaco.99
c. Third Factor: The Amount and Substantiality of the Copying
The third factor to be considered is the amount and substantiality
of the copying."° This inquiry relates both to the quantity and quality
of the portion used.1"1 If the portion appropriated is minimal or insig-
nificant, the use is more likely to be fair.'0 2
Texaco advanced three arguments regarding the third factor.
First, Texaco asserted that this factor is "largely irrelevant" when the
copy is not distributed or sold, and thus does not supersede the de-
95. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 898: "Though the publishers still have not established a conven-
tional market for the direct sale and distribution of individual articles, they have created,
primarily through the CCC, a workable market for institutional users to obtain licenses for
the right to produce their own copies of individual articles via photocopying." Id.
96. Id. at 899.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
98. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563; see also New Era Publications v. Carol Pub-
lishing, 904 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 921 (1990).
99. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 893.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
101. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65.
102. Id.
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mand for the original. 10 3 Because Dr. Chickering made photocopies
for his personal reference, Texaco asserted that the third factor was
not useful in determining whether the copies were fair.104 Conspicu-
ously, Texaco did not cite any controlling precedent in support of this
proposition.
In response, the court recognized that some commentators sup-
port Texaco's position, 0 5 but concluded that the third factor is rele-
vant to considerations other than sale or distribution. 10 6 The court
found that by focusing on the amount of copying, the courts gain "in-
sight into the purpose and character of the use as [they] consider
whether the quantity of the material used was 'reasonable in relation
to the purpose of the copying."' 107 Thus, the copying of eight entire
articles weakened Texaco's claim that the copies' intended function
was laboratory use, and strengthened the court's finding that their in-
tended function was to augment Dr. Chickering's personal library.
Texaco's second argument claimed that Dr. Chickering photo-
copied only eight articles from a year's worth of Catalysis issues,
which constituted only 0.26 percent of the pages published during that
year. 10 8 Thus, the "amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole" was trivial.' 0 9
The court concurred with Judge Leval's conclusion that each arti-
cle, rather than the entire journal, constituted a separately copy-
righted work." 0 The court stated that each article enjoyed separate
copyright protection, which the authors transferred to Catalysis' pub-
lisher prior to publication. 1'
Despite the court's analysis, some commentators have asserted
that it is at least arguable that copyrights for periodicals cover entire
journals and not each individual article. 1 2 This conclusion has some
merit because, as Texaco's brief noted, the entire issue of the journal,
not each article, is registered for copyright. 1' 3 Although the individual
articles enjoyed separate copyright protection prior to publication,
103. Brief for Texaco, supra note 51, at 28.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 1661, 1678 (1988).
106. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 894.
107. Id. (quoting Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175).
108. Brief for Texaco, supra note 51, at 29.
109. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(3)).
110. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 894.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Laura N. Gasaway, Wide Impact Seen for Photocopying Case, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 16, 1993, at 21.
113. Brief for Texaco, supra note 51, at 4.
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that copyright was subsumed into the entire issue of Catalysis upon
publication (as the court conceded). Also, because publishers' reve-
nues are derived mostly from subscriptions to entire journals, rather
than fees for reprints or copies of single articles, it seems reasonable
that the amount of copying should be based on the percentage of ma-
terial copied from the journal as a whole. Given the persuasiveness of
these arguments, one can easily conclude that the Second Circuit
shirked its responsibility when it easily conceded to Judge Leval's
findings.
Texaco's third argument asserted that even if the court viewed
each article as a separately copyrighted work, "in some instances,
copying a work wholesale has been held to be fair use.' 1 14 Texaco
cited Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios and William & Wilkins as
demonstrative cases in which copying entire works constituted fair
use.115 In response, the court recognized that use of entire works is
not dispositive, but correctly noted that this fact mitigates against a
finding of fair use." 6
d. Fourth Factor: Effect on Potential Market or Value of the Original
Work
The fourth statutory factor is the unauthorized reproduction's ef-
fect on the market for the original." 7 Most courts afford this factor
great significance; and the Supreme Court has described it as "un-
doubtedly the single most important element of fair use.""' 8
Citing the Supreme Court and various circuit courts, Texaco
claimed that for a copyright owner to prevail on this factor, the unau-
thorized copy must materially impair the market for the original. 1 9
According to Texaco, Dr. Chickering's photocopies did not demon-
strably affect Catalysis' profits because: (1) the record and common
sense indicated that Texaco would not order more subscriptions if its
scientists were barred from photocopying articles; and (2) alternate
licensing schemes advocated by Judge Leval (such as the CCC) were
irrelevant because their consideration "reversed the inquiry from an
examination of what the author actually lost into an examination of
114. Id. at 29 (quoting Williams & Wilkins, 803 F.2d at 1263).
115. Id.
116. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 894.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (Supp. IV 1992).
118. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
119. Brief for Texaco, supra note 51, at 30 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567; Rog-
ers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir.), cert denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992);
Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991); Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d
at 1264.
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what the author might conceivably gain if he had the power of a fed-
eral court behind him."12 Even if the expansion of traditional licens-
ing methods was relevant, Texaco concluded, a decision based on their
existence would trump legislative authority because it would consti-
tute a judicial expansion of copyright protection without Congress'
permission.12'
In response, the Second Circuit acknowledged that journal pub-
lishers have not traditionally provided convenient means for users to
legally copy articles. 22 The consequence of this, according to the
court, was that the effect of photocopies on the traditional market for
journal subscriptions was less significant than it would be if a conve-
nient method existed.'23 Nevertheless, the court examined the effect
on sales of additional journal subscriptions, back issues and back
volumes of Catalysis, and held that the evidence was inconclusive as to
the traditional market affect of widespread photocopying like Dr.
Chickering's. 24 At best, the court concluded that the possible loss of
a few subscriptions "tips the fourth factor only slightly toward the
publishers because evidence of such loss is weak ... that the copied
articles themselves have lost any value.' '1 25
The court's analysis did not stop there, however, because it found
that the uniqueness of the scientific journal industry mandated a less
traditional fourth factor inquiry. Thus, recently developed licensing
revenue and fee systems like the CCC126 deserved attention because
"this distinctive arrangement raises novel questions concerning the
significance of the publishers' establishment of an innovative licensing
scheme for the photocopying of individual journal articles.'1 27
120. Brief for Texaco, supra note 51, at 37 (emphasis in original).
121. Id. at 41.
122. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 895.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 896-97.
125. Id. at 897.
126. Although the CCC will be fully discussed in Part III, it can briefly be described as
a "not-for-profit organization established by publishers and authors to facilitate compli-
ance with copyright law," and to eliminate the need for users to secure advance permission
to copy original works. See Karen Gantz, Guidelines for the Permissible Photocopying of
Newsletters and Newspapers for Corporate Use, 41 Bus. LAw. 1327, 1335 (1986). "It is a
clearinghouse for the licensing of and receipt of fees for copyrighted materials .... Copy-
right owners enter their works in the CCC and grant permission in advance to registered
users to photocopy such works upon payment of a specified fee," which is "based on either
a per transaction charge or an annual license fee." Id.
127. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 895. This heavy emphasis on the CCC in the court's fourth
factor analysis is the most noteworthy and controversial element of the Texaco case.
Although this Note will provide a more complete discussion of the CCC in Parts III and
IV, the reader should be aware of this unorthodox approach taken by both Texaco courts.
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The court asserted that the impact on potential licensing revenues
is an undisputedly proper inquiry under the fourth factor. However,
the court qualified this by recognizing that only "traditional, reason-
able or likely to be developed markets" are legitimate subjects of fair
use inquiry. 128 Relying on Judge Leval's finding that many major cor-
porations utilize the CCC's licensing services,129 the court concluded
that the CCC is such a reasonable system through which users may
compensate copyright owners. Thus, potential CCC revenues that
may have been lost due to corporate photocopying were an appropri-
ate fair use inquiry.130 In response to Texaco's dismissal of the CCC's
relevance, the court maintained that it is "not unsound to conclude
that the right to seek payment for a particular use tends to become
legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when the means for
paying for such a use is made easier.' 31 Thus, because Catalysis was
covered by a CCC license at the time of Dr. Chickering's photocopy-
ing, the court found the use "less fair" because there was an available
means to pay for the copies.' 32
The court bolstered its position by arguing that Congress has
twice implied that courts should recognize licensing fees for photo-
copying as part of the fourth factor. First, the court maintained that
by restricting the circumstances in which libraries can photocopy
under section 108, Congress implicitly recognized the right of publish-
ers to restrict photocopying. 33 Second, legislative history reflects that
upon enactment of the Copyright Act, Congress prompted the devel-
opment of the CCC by suggesting the development of a practicable
system for licensing photocopies.' 34 This desire to facilitate payment
to copyright holders, according to the court, reflects Congress' recog-
nition of licensing fees "as part of the potential market for journal
articles."'1 35
Based on the foregoing, the court found that "the publishers have
demonstrated a substantial harm to the value of their copyrights
through [Texaco's] copying," and thus concluded that the fourth factor
favored the publishers. 3 6 Although the court dedicated little more
than two pages of its opinion to the CCC, its concession that the pub-
128. Id. at 897 (citing Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1178).
129. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 25.
130. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 898.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 898-99.
133. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 899.
134. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 71.
135. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 899.
136. Id. (quoting Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 21).
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lisher's lost subscription revenues were de minimis demonstrates that
the CCC was instrumental in tipping the fourth factor against Texaco.
This heavy reliance on the CCC to decide the most important fair use
factor deserves close scrutiny. Since the court's conclusion rested on a
finding that the CCC provides an efficient method for corporations to
photocopy legally, a careful look at the CCC's practical worth is nec-
essary to determine if the court's reliance on the CCC is justified. 37 If
not, the Second Circuit's dependence on one private, not-for-profit
organization to determine the most important factor of this pivotal
case could significantly undermine the legitimacy of the Texaco
decision.
3. Aggregate Assessment
In sum, the court concluded that three of the four statutory fac-
tors favored the publishers. 138 Regarding Texaco's equitable claims,
the court deferred (without discussion) to Judge Leval's findings that:
(1) the Sony decision cited by Texaco was distinguishable because the
work of Texaco's scientists was neither private nor non-commercial as
in Sony; (2) the William & Wilkins case was similarly inapposite be-
cause of significant statutory and factual changes that have transpired
since the 1973 decision; (3) the publishers were not taking advantage
of the authors' copyrights to advance their own gain; and (4) Texaco
was not entitled to section 108 protection because it did not meet the
clause's narrow prerequisites. 139 Thus, the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's conclusion that Texaco's photocopying of Catalysis'
articles was not fair use.'4 ° The court's closing advice to Texaco (and
presumably all corporations with similar photocopying practices) was
that it "use the licensing schemes now existing or some variant of
them, or, if all else fails, purchase one more subscription for each of its
researchers who wish to keep issues of Catalysis on the office shelf.' 141
C. Dissenting Opinion
In a lengthy and impassioned dissent,' 42 Judge Jacobs broke with
the majority on the first and fourth statutory factors and asserted that
137. See infra, Part III.
138. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 899.
139. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 21-27.
140. The court also disputed the dissent's prediction that the case would abolish fair use
photocopying for most journals. The court naively insisted that the scope of their ruling
was narrowly "confined to the archival photocopying revealed by the record." Texaco, 37
F.3d at 899.
141. Id.
142. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 900-08.
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these elements, plus equitable considerations and the overriding pur-
pose of the Copyright Act, confirmed that Dr. Chickeriffg's photo-
copying constituted fair use.
1. First Factor: The Purpose and Character of the Use
As to the first factor, Judge Jacobs maintained that Dr. Chicker-
ing's use was fair because it "[was] integral to transformative and pro-
ductive ends of scientific research."' 43 He first noted that Dr.
Chickering's photocopies facilitated research, and that section 107
provides that "the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use
by reproduction in copies.., for purposes such as... scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright."" Given that Dr.
Chickering's purpose fit within one of the statutory categories of fair
use, Judge Jacobs cited Second Circuit precedent to conclude that Dr.
Chickering's photocopying was presumptively fair.' 45
Judge Jacobs also disagreed with the characterization of Dr.
Chickering's file as an archive, which he defined as "a bulk of docu-
ments accumulated by a bureaucratic process and serving as a re-
source for public or institutional reference."' 46 Judge Jacobs argued
that Dr. Chickering's file contained articles to assist the memory,
thought processes, and organization of an individual researcher, and
were therefore part of a transformative process of scientific research,
rather than a static archive of documents. 4 7
Finally, Judge Jacobs echoed Texaco's argument that Dr. Chicker-
ing's use was reasonable and customary, and thus more likely to be
fair.' 48 He also criticized the majority for under-emphasizing Dr.
Chickering's personal use of the articles.'49 Judge Jacobs felt that the
lack of distribution or sale of the copies was a crucial fact that should
have tipped the first factor in favor of Texaco. 150
143. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 900 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added).
145. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 900 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (citing Wright v. Warner Books, Inc.,
953 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir. 1991) ("there is a strong presumption that factor one favors the
defendant if the allegedly infringing work fits the description of uses described in section
107"); New Era Publications, 904 F.2d at 156; Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90,
96 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987)).
146. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 901 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 901-2. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550 ("[t]he fair use doctrine was
predicated on the author's implied consent to 'reasonable and customary' use.").
149. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 901-02 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 903-04.
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2. Fourth Factor: Effect Upon Potential Market or Value of the Original
Work
As to the fourth factor, Judge Jacobs argued that "the adverse
effect of Dr. Chickering's use upon the potential market for the work,
or upon its value, [was] illusory." '151 He agreed with the majority that
Dr. Chickering's copies did not threaten the publisher's market for
subscriptions and back issues, but condemned the court's characteriza-
tion of the CCC as a "traditional, reasonable, or likely [to be] devel-
oped" market.152
Judge Jacobs surveyed the structure of the CCC and noted many
weaknesses which he felt verified that it is not a workable market wor-
thy of fair use consideration. First, Judge Jacobs asserted that the
CCC's per-copy transaction license is impractical because the user
must determine whether the publisher and publication are covered by
the CCC every time they copy an article. Also, once it is determined
that the article is covered, the user must record the date, time, publi-
cation name, number of pages copied, etc., and periodically forward
the information to the CCC.153 Judge Jacobs also claimed that only
thirty percent of publishers are covered by a CCC license.1 54 This
means that both the per-copy transaction license and the blanket li-
cense (which covers photocopying at a set annual rate and does not
require the user to report individual copies) are inadequate because
articles printed by seventy percent of publishers are not covered by
the CCC.155 Based on the foregoing, Judge Jacobs concluded that the
CCC is not a workable market. 156
Finally, Judge Jacobs criticized the majority for engaging in circu-
lar reasoning. As he put it:
It is hard to escape the conclusion that the existence of the CCC...
is the chief support for the idea that photocopying scholarly articles
is unfair in the first place .... The majority expressly declines to
"decide how the fair use balance would be resolved if a photocopy-
ing license for Catalysis articles were not currently available. '' 7
Because the Texaco decision requires a CCC license for corporations
that photocopy articles but do not buy subscriptions for every inter-
ested employee, Judge Jacobs concluded that this decision effectively
151. Id. at 900.
152. Id. at 904.
153. Id. at 904.
154. Id. The CCC maintains that this statistic is false. See infra text accompanying
notes 202-205.
155. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 905 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 905.
157. Id. (quoting Texaco majority opinion, 37 F.3d at 898-99).
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eliminated fair use photocopying of journals that are not members of
the CCC.158
3. Equitable Considerations
Finally, Judge Jacobs noted that fair use is an equitable doctrine
designed to "'avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed
to foster.'1 59 He argued that the Texaco decision thwarts the purpose
of the Copyright Act because authors publish articles for exposure
and prestige rather than money.160 The decision, he argued, would
add to the cost and effort scientists must expend to access scholarly
articles, and therefore diminish the primary reward authors receive
from publication-dissemination to their peers. Thus, Texaco benefits
the commercial interests of copyright holders, but does not benefit
authors or further scientific progress.
61
For all of the foregoing equitable and statutory reasons, Judge
Jacobs concluded that Dr. Chickering's photocopying decidedly con-
stituted a fair use of copyrighted materials.
D. Subsequent Developments
On December 23, 1994, the Second Circuit issued an amended
opinion in response to a petition for rehearing submitted by Texaco. 162
The court denied the petition but partially modified its decision in or-
der to dispel any appearance that its initial opinion overemphasized
the fourth factor.163 The court quoted Supreme Court precedent' 64
stressing that no single fair use element enjoys primacy, and that a
proper application of the doctrine requires the court to balance all
four statutory factors. 65
Shortly after issuance of the amended opinion, Texaco petitioned
the Second Circuit for a rehearing en banc,'166 and in April filed a
158. Id. at 906.
159. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549).
160. In fact, authors are very rarely paid by publishers to print their articles.
161. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 907 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
162. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., No. 92-9341, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
36735 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 1994).
163. Telephone Interview with Robert S. Weiner, Vice-President, Sales and Marketing
of the Copyright Clearance Center (Jan. 30, 1995).
164. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171.
165. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 889 (as amended on denial of rehearing, Dec. 23, 1994); See
Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171 ("all [four statutory factors] are to be explored, and the results
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright").
166. Affidavit of Thomas A. Smart in Support of Texaco's Motion for an Extension of
Time to File a Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Ameri-
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petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. 167 These actions will
likely prove moot, however, because on May 11, 1995, the parties en-
tered into a conditional settlement of the case.168  Conceding no
wrongdoing, Texaco agreed to pay a seven-figure settlement to the
plaintiffs.169 Texaco will also pay a retroactive licensing fee to the
CCC and enter into a five-year license agreement with the collec-
tive, 7 ° further evincing the CCC's pivotal role in the Texaco decision.
Pending final approval of the settlement by the parties and trial judge,
Texaco has requested that the Second Circuit defer its petition for re-
hearing en banc,171 and the petition for certiorari has been carried
over to the Supreme Court's 1995-96 term. 172 Hence, settlement of
the Texaco matter seems imminent.
Despite these developments, the Second Circuit issued an unso-
licited second amended opinion on July 17, 1995, in an apparent at-
tempt to narrow the court's closely scrutinized conclusions. 173 The
court emphasized that its holding only applies to "institutional, sys-
tematic copying," not copying by individual researchers. 174  In an
amended dissent, Judge Jacobs refuted the majority's reliance on Tex-
aco's institutional framework, concluding that "the institutional envi-
ronment in which Dr. Chickering works does not alter the character of
the copying done by him ... [a scientist's copying] does not become
systematic because some number of other scientists in the same insti-
tution ... are doing the same thing.' 1 75
can Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. (2d Cir.) (No. 92-9341) [hereinafter Smart
Affidavit].
167. Texaco, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3788 (U.S.
Apr. 24, 1995) (No. 94-1726).
168. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement and Settlement Hearing at 6, Ameri-
can Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. (S.D.N.Y.) (85 Civ. 3446).
169. Id. at 1.
170. Id.
171. Smart Affidavit, supra note 166, at 1.
172. 64 U.S.L.W. 3, at d35.
173. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 916 (as amended on July 17, 1995).
174. The court stated that:
[W]e do not deal with the question of copying by an individual, for personal use
in research or otherwise (not for resale), recognizing that under the fair use doc-
trine ... such a practice by an individual might well not constitute an infringe-
ment. In other words, our opinion does not decide the case that would arise if
Chickering were a professor or an independent scientist engaged in copying and
creating files for independent research, as opposed to being employed by an insti-
tution in the pursuit of his research on the institution's behalf.
Id.




The Copyright Clearance Center
The Second Circuit's dependence on alternative licensing
schemes was a significant victory for the CCC. If it remains unchal-
lenged, the Texaco decision will inevitably prompt the growth of the
CCC and similar organizations and inspire private organizations of all
types and sizes to utilize their services. In addition to Texaco, im-
proved technology will inspire reliance on alternative licensing pro-
grams as the photocopying machine facilitates more widespread and
decentralized use of copyrighted material and makes individual moni-
toring even more difficult. Thus, a close look at the CCC is necessary
to determine if it is truly a workable market worthy of and ready for
the probable changes to come.
A. Reproduction Rights Organizations
Reproduction rights organizations (RROs) are associations that
license businesses, firms, universities, photocopying services, and indi-
viduals to photocopy books and articles. 176 Internationally, there are
currently over twenty RROs that participate in the International Fed-
eration for Reproduction Rights Organizations (IFRRO), 1' 7 and
many have reciprocal agreements that permit publishers in one coun-
try to secure a share of fees collected by an RRO in another coun-
try.1 78 By providing centralized collection services, RROs are able to
lower licensing fees and encourage lawful copying.1 79
176. RROs are a relatively recent development, as most of them were established less
than fifteen years ago. See STANLEY M. BESEN & SHEILA N. KIRBY, COMPENSATING CRE-
ATORS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: COLLECTIVES THAT COLLECT 45 (1989).
177. These include:
BONUS (Sweden), CanCopy (Canada), Centre Francais du Copyright (France),
Centro Espanol de Derechose Reprograficos (Spain), Copyrights Agency Limited
(Australia), the Copyright Clearance Center (United States), Fjolis (Iceland),
Kopinor (Norway), Literar-Mechana (Austria), Musikedition (Austria), Pro Lit-
teris-Teledrama (Switzerland), Stitchting Reprorecht (The Netherlands), the
Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd. (United Kingdom), Union des Ecrivains
Quebecois (Canada), and VG Wort (Federal Republic of Germany).
Id.
178. For example, the CCC's international service is one of its currently expanding pro-
grams. Under agreements with foreign RROs, over $4,000,000 in fees were transferred to
the U.S. through the CCC in 1994. See COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CENTER, ANNUAL RE-
PORT TO RIGHTSHOLDERS 1994 [hereinafter CCC 1994 ANNUAL REPORT].
179. Stanley M. Besen et al., An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L.
REV. 383 (1992).
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B. The Copyright Clearance Center: History and General Structure
The Copyright Clearance Center is a nonprofit organization
founded in 1978 in response to a Congressional proposal that an effi-
cient system for licensing photocopies be developed. 18° Initially, the
CCC's primary sponsors were publisher and author organizations, but
today its board of directors is also comprised of representatives of pri-
vate business, university organizations, and scientific groups. 18' The
CCC strives to enroll as many publishers as possible so that it can
offer wide licensing protection to a large number of users.182
The CCC's basic function is collecting licensing fees from users
and distributing them to publishers, thereby eliminating the need for
users to contact publishers directly. Publishers do not pay for the
CCC's service. Rather, the CCC covers its costs out of the fees it col-
lects from users. By paying the CCC for its photocopies, users avoid
infringement liability for reproducing the works of publishers that are
registered with the CCC. This protection extends only to internal use,
however, thus exposing users to liability if they distribute, circulate, or
sell their copies. 18 3
1. The Transactional Reporting Service
The CCC offers two main services to non-academic users: the
Transactional Reporting Service (TRS) and the Annual Authoriza-
tions Service (AAS). The TRS is the CCC's first and oldest program.
Under this arrangement, publishers establish a fee for each of their
copyrighted works they wish to license. Subscribers must inventory
and regularly report to the CCC any photocopies made from CCC
registered publications. The CCC then calculates what each publisher
is owed and bills the subscriber."8 Due to its detailed record keeping
requirements, this service is inefficient for large corporations. Its pri-
mary participants include document suppliers, libraries, government
agencies, medical centers, small corporations, and individuals.185 To
date, the TRS authorizes more than fifteen-hundred organizations to
make photocopies from over 1.7 million works registered in the
program.186
180. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 71 ("[c]onceming library photocopying
practices not authorized by [the 1976 Copyright Act], the committee recommends that
workable clearance and licensing procedures be developed").
181. CCC 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 178.
182. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 176, at 47.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 48-49.
185. CCC 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 178.
186. Id.
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2. The Annual Authorizations Service
In response to requests for a less burdensome method for paying
royalties, the CCC introduced the Annual Authorizations Service in
1983. Today, the AAS is the major source of revenue for the CCC, 18'
providing licenses to over six thousand for-profit corporations and
their subsidiaries.18 8 This service offers a so-called "blanket license
'
that permits users to make unlimited copies of works registered with
the CCC for an annual fee. Since its inception, the AAS has em-
ployed three different methods for determining photocopying fees.
Although all three are still available, nearly all subscribers choose to
utilize the most recent method, the "pooled industry" model.8 9
Under this method, the copying practices of a user are determined not
by a survey of its own copying, but on statistical models of photocopy-
ing customs in the user's industry.19° Fees are then based on this in-
dustry-wide model. Regardless of the preferred fee-setting scheme,
the user may renew its AAS license at the same fee for a second year.
In addition to the AAS and TRS, the CCC offers additional and
more specifically tailored programs. For example, its Academic Per-
missions Service provides permission and pre-approval services re-
lated to the production of academic coursepacks. 191 The CCC also
serves as an informational resource to publishers by providing person-
alized responses to questions, and hosting various meetings on copy-
right law. Finally, the CCC has reciprocal agreements with RROs in
other countries that transfer royalties from photocopying abroad to
U.S. publishers. 92
C. The Copyright Clearance Center: Breadth of Coverage
As highlighted by the Texaco majority's and dissent's conflicting
assessments of the CCC, the breadth of the CCC's coverage and its
ability to serve all of this nation's publishers and users is debatable.
Therefore, analysis of the CCC's market coverage is necessary to de-
termine whether it truly, as claimed by the Texaco court, offers a prac-
ticable mechanism for all users to legally reproduce copyrighted
works.
187. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 176, at 49.
188. Telephone Interview with Robert S. Weiner, Vice President, Sales and Marketing
of the Copyright Clearance Center (Sept. 13, 1995).
189. Telephone Interview with Robert S. Weiner, supra note 163.
190. Id.
191. Copyright Clearance Center, Creating Copyright Solutions, 1993 [hereinafter CCC
BROCHURE].
192. See CCC 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 178.
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The CCC has grown considerably since its inception in 1978.
Although it struggled to survive for the first few years,193 the CCC has
experienced dramatic growth since it introduced the AAS in 1983.194
For example, from 1989 to 1994, the CCC's disbursements to publish-
ers increased from $2.5 million' 95 to $18.4 million;196 the number of
publishers enrolled with the CCC increased from 6,200197 to 9,000;198
and the number of publications covered by a CCC license increased
from 1 million' 99 to 1.7 million.2 0 Although this expansion is impres-
sive, the pertinent question is whether the CCC has grown enough to
justify the Second Circuit's inference that it can and should become
the leading method of copyright compliance for most corporate users.
1. Currently Licensed Publishers and Publications
Judge Jacobs' dissent in Texaco argues that users should not be
forced to rely on the CCC because only thirty percent of publishers
are enrolled in the program.20 ' This statistic, according to the CCC, is
both outdated and misleading.20 2 Currently, there are over 9,200 pub-
lishers that utilize the CCC's licensing systems.20 3 But what is impor-
tant, according to the CCC, is not the number of publishers but the
number of works that are licensed. The CCC concedes that while it
does not license all works, it has identified through surveys the scien-
tific and academic works most frequently photocopied.20 4 Conse-
quently, the CCC maintains that as much as 75 to 85% of commonly
photocopied works are covered by the CCC. 20 5
Even given this statistic, the question remains as to what options
are available to a user who wants to copy one of the 15 to 25% of
popular works lacking a CCC license. The Texaco decision explicitly
states that in this scenario, the user's only alternatives are to contact
193. See REGISTER'S 1988 REPORT, supra note 18, at 30. In 1984, the CCC attempted to
introduce a so-called "Umbrella Statute" to bolster its revenues. Congress never adopted
the proposal, but the CCC expanded nevertheless. See infra text accompanying notes 238-
243.
194. REGISTER'S 1988 REPORT, supra note 18, at 30.
195. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 176, at 46 n.3- (citing Copyright Clearance Center
release Feb. 9, 1989).
196. CCC 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 178.
197. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 176, at 47.
198. CCC 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 178.
199. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 176, at 47.
200. CCC 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 178.
201. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 904 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
202. Telephone Interview with Robert S. Weiner, supra note 163.
203. Telephone Interview with Robert S. Weiner, supra note 188.
204. Id.
205. Telephone Interview with Robert S. Weiner, supra note 163.
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the publisher directly or buy an additional subscription, °6 both of
which seem highly impractical. Thus, according to the CCC's own sta-
tistics, it seems that fair use photocopying has been severely restricted
with regard to 15 to 25% of regularly copied works. The inevitable
conclusion is that until the CCC reaches near complete coverage, it is
unreasonable for courts to place such heavy reliance on the CCC to
determine fair use.
2. Number of Subscribers
Although it is difficult to obtain precise statistics,20 7 the CCC re-
ports that to date, more than 6,200 private organizations, including
more than 80% of the "Fortune 100" companies, utilize their licensing
services.208 However, as conceded by the Texaco court, some for-
profit institutions that engage in photocopying have been reluctant to
join the CCC "largely because of uncertainty concerning the legal
questions at issue in [the Texaco case]. '209 Regardless of any per-
ceived hesitancy to join the CCC, one fact is evident: if one of Tex-
aco's intended effects was to increase reliance on alternative licensing
schemes, it is working. Since the district and circuit court decisions
came down, the CCC has reported increased interest among organiza-
tions that were unsure about what kinds of copying constituted fair
use, and has adopted a "wait and see" attitude pending resolution of
the Texaco case.210 The present number of CCC subscribers inevitably
will grow if the Texaco decision remains unchallenged. Given the im-
port the Second Circuit attached to Texaco's failure to adequately util-
ize the CCC, any corporation engaging in photocopying that is
206. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 899:
If Texaco wants to continue the precise copying we hold not to be a fair use, it can
either use the licensing schemes now existing or some variant of them, or, if all
else fails, purchase one more subscription for each of its researchers who wish to
keep issues of Catalysis on the office shelf.
Id.
207. One of the major tenets of the CCC is the issue of confidentiality, so it is impossi-
ble to obtain specific information about most CCC subscribers. Because the CCC has ac-
cess to a wealth of information regarding how much and what types of publications
corporations are copying, it has to be very security-conscious, and has entered into confi-
dentiality agreements with most of its users. Telephone Interview with Robert S. Weiner,
supra note 163.
208. The CCC's enrolled users include corporations, law firms, documents suppliers,
libraries, universities, copy shops, and bookstores. Telephone Interview with Robert S.
Weiner, supra note 188.
209. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 897 n.16.
210. Telephone Interview with Robert S. Weiner, supra note 163. See also Gasaway,
supra note 112, at 21.
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cognizant of recent legal developments would be foolish to ignore the
CCC's services.
D. Overview: Strengths and Weaknesses of the Copyright Clearance
Center
One of the CCC's greatest strengths lies in its basic structure: by
providing a centralized licensing scheme, the system lowers collection
costs and encourages copyright compliance.211 Also, the CCC has
continuously increased its breadth of service and efficiency over the
212years, as exemplified by the AAS' streamlined annual payment
mechanism.213 A factor that benefits subscribers is that to encourage
compliance through the CCC, many publishers charge less for a CCC
transactional license than they do for private licenses. Another perk
is that AAS licenses may be renewed for a second year at the same
price.214 Moreover, because the CCC stresses confidentiality, users
are assured that their identity and the subject of their photocopying
remains secret.21 5 Probably the greatest strength of the CCC, how-
ever, is the backing it has received from the copyright community.
Although the CCC has its critics,216 authorities such as the Texaco
court,2 1 7 the former Register of Copyrights, 21s and Melville Nim-
mer219 all advocate the use and continued expansion of the CCC.
Despite its virtues, the CCC suffers from some notable shortcom-
ings. Probably its biggest weakness is that it does not license 15 to
25% of commonly photocopied works.22 0 Moreover, small businesses
are disadvantaged because the smaller-scale TRS requires burden-
some record keeping221 and the AAS favors larger corporations.
222
This is because annual licensing fees are determined by an industry-
211. Besen et al., supra note 179, at 383.
212. NIMMER, supra note 64, § 13.05[E][4][e].
213. Another recent improvement is the CCC's establishment of a site on the World
Wide Web, providing to publishers and potential users convenient on-line access to most of
the CCC's services. M.A. Stapleton, Public Could Resist Copyright Rule Changes Meant to
Embrace New Technologies: Expert, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., June 9, 1995, at 1.
214. GASAWAY & WIANT, supra note 9, at 70.
215. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 207.
216. See, e.g., Texaco, 37 F.3d at 904-06 (Jacobs, J., dissenting); Junda Woo, Photocopy-
ing Case Shows Flaws in System to Monitor Royalties, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1995, at 15;
Deborah Barnum, Law Firm Library Photocopying and the Myth of the Fair Use 'Excuse',
19 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 35, 36 (1993); BIELEFIELD & CHEESEMAN, supra note 44, at 100.
217. Texaco, 37 F.3d at 897-99.
218. See REGISTER'S 1988 REPORT, supra note 18, at 29-33; REGISTER'S 1983 REPORT,
supra note 19, at 348-51.
219. NIMMER, supra note 64, § 13.05[E][4][e].
220. See supra text accompanying notes 201-206.
221. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 176, at 48.
222. Id. at 51-53.
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wide survey. Therefore, subscribers that make more photocopies and
copy more expensive publications (i.e., large businesses) pay much
less per copy than small organizations with more modest photocopy-
ing practices.223 More generally, given that AAS licenses average tens
of thousands of dollars per year, 224 start-up businesses might simply
be unable to afford the CCC regardless of their photocopying
needs.22 5 Although the CCC is developing a new service aimed at
smaller corporations, 226 this service could take years to catch on, if at
all.
Another problem is that very few legal publishers are licensed by
the CCC.227 Although it is purely speculative what impact the Texaco
decision will have on the legal profession,2 cautious law librarians
wishing to protect their firms will find that major legal publications
are not covered by a CCC license. A final problem is that even
though the CCC was founded to facilitate compliance with the Copy-
right Act, the CCC's existence substantially increases the risk of liabil-
ity. This is evidenced by cases that have been resolved in favor of
publishers largely because their works were licensed by the CCC.229
E. Alternatives to the Copyright Clearance Center
Although the CCC does not adequately serve some organiza-
tions, it should be noted that alternative compliance mechanisms are
available. Instead of waiting to be sued for infringement, users can
223. Id. at 50-51.
224. Woo, supra note 216, at 15.
225. In response to this criticism, the CCC argues that photocopy licenses are simply
another de minimis business cost, and that companies that cannot afford a license are prob-
ably not fit to be operating a business where copyrighted works are photocopied. The
CCC claims that photocopy licenses usually cost less than a corporation's yearly supply of
paper. Telephone Interview with Robert S. Weiner, supra note 188.
226. The new service, which should be operative by 1996, is a full-scale version of the
AAS tailored for small companies. The program is aimed at both for-profit and not for-
profit corporations with fewer than 500 employees. See CCC 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 178; Telephone Interview with Robert S. Weiner, supra note 188.
227. See Phares, supra note 71, at 37. The CCC disputes this assessment, pointing out
that although major legal publishers such as West and CCH are not enrolled in the pro-
gram, others, such as BNA and Lawyer Cooperatives, are. Telephone Interview with Rob-
ert S. Weiner, supra note 188.
228. See Marc J. Luzemburg, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1994, at 2 (after
explaining that most law firms maintain archives of photocopied law review articles, trea-
tises, cases, and books, the writer asked: "[d]oes the court's opinion mean that all these
attorneys owe royalties to the Law Journal and West Publishing Company, among
others?").
229. See, e.g., Texaco, 37 F.3d at 899; Harper & Row, Publishers v. Squibb, Co., No. 82-
2363 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Harper & Row, Publishers v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 81-7813
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). Both Harper & Row cases ended in settlements that required the de-
fendant to subscribe to the CCC.
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obtain articles from document delivery services, try to get a photocopy
license directly from the publisher, or buy additional copies of the
original.2 3° If these methods seem impractical, more streamlined dis-
tribution systems are available: CARL/Uncover, which provides on-
line searches and quick delivery by fax; 31 Pubnet, an electronic mail
book order and inventory system offered by the Association of Amer-
ican Publishers;2 32 suppliers of pre-authorized materials such as the
Institute for Scientific Information (ISI), which provides tearsheets
and authorized photocopies, and University Microfilms International
(UMI) which provides microform copies of serials volumes;2 33 and in-
formation broker companies that do research and supply data on a
wide variety of topics to anyone who is interested. 34 In sum, a busi-
ness frustrated by Texaco's focus on the CCC can take comfort in the
presence of alternative programs that are worthy of investigation.
F. The Copyright Clearance Center: Conclusions
It is evident that the CCC is an expanding and efficient organiza-
tion that provides many organizations with a workable mechanism to
legally photocopy many copyrighted works. However, the system has
not yet expanded to a level where it can fully meet the needs of all
potential subscribers. If courts follow Texaco's lead and place heavy
reliance on the CCC, unjust decisions could result unless the system's
shortcomings are corrected. Thus, the CCC (and similar organiza-
tions) needs to meet the court's expectations and reach near-complete
coverage as soon as possible. The CCC, however, cannot reach this
goal alone. If publishers want their copyrights enforced, they should
enroll all of their works with the CCC so that users wishing to photo-
copy legally can do so with ease. Similarly, for-profit organizations
should encourage each other to subscribe to the CCC in order to re-
duce the threat of litigation. Through this kind of cooperative effort,
the CCC might be able to reach its full potential and become the
model option for copyright compliance the Texaco court made it out
to be.
230. The Texaco court mentioned all of these as possible alternatives to the CCC. Tex-
aco, 37 F.3d at 899.
231. GASAWAY & WIANT, supra note 9, at 71.
232. Id.
233. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES
OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 61-62 (July 31, 1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT].
234. Id. at 62.
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IV
The Future of Corporate Photocopying
A. Predictions
Current trends indicate that the increasing cost of library materi-
als and the relentless advance of technology will induce heavy reliance
on photocopying as a primary vehicle for exchange of information.
Thus, the conflicts presented in the Texaco case will only worsen ab-
sent sound legal guidance. As the need for convenient photocopying
methods poses a growing threat to copyright owners' exclusive rights,
various practical, legislative, and judicial responses are possible.
Practically, the CCC will probably continue to expand and be-
come an accepted fixture in most private organizations. In addition,
the CCC is likely to soon face growing competition. As the demand
for alternative licensing mechanisms increases, new collectives can be
expected to arise to compensate for the CCC's shortcomings and pro-
vide alternatives to its existing services.
Legislatively, significant amendment to the Copyright Act is
doubtful. Although in 1978, the National Commission on New Tech-
nological Uses of Copyrighted Works235 indicated that revision was
possible by advocating a "wait and see" attitude regarding major
changes in the Act's photocopying provisions,236 and the Williams &
Wilkins court declared that "the problem of photo and mechanical re-
production calls for legislative guidance, '237 there has been little re-
cent pressure to amend the Copyright Act. This does not mean,
however, that legislative reform is not feasible. One proposal in par-
ticular, initially recommended by the Register of Copyrights in
1983,238 deserves renewed attention in light of Texaco's substantial re-
liance on the CCC.
This proposal, the so-called "Umbrella Statute," was conceived
by the Association of American Publishers as a way to encourage par-
ticipation in copyright licensing systems like the CCC. The Statute
would place a limit on remedies available to copyright owners suing
235. Congress created this committee (known as CONTU) in 1974 to:
[S]tudy and compile data on ... the reproduction and use of copyrighted works of
authorship.., by various forms of machine reproduction, not including reproduc-
tion at the request of instructors for use in fact-to-fact teaching activities [and to]
make recommendations as to such changes in copyright law or procedures that
may be necessary to assure for such purposes access to copyrighted works, and to
provide recognition of the rights of copyright owners.
Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873.
236. CONTU REPORT, supra note 233, at 48.
237. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1362 (emphasis added).
238. REGISTER'S 1983 REPORT, supra note 19, at 348-51.
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for infringement who failed to join a qualified licensing program or
offer a qualified licensing program of their own.239 The Statute would
be limited to scientific, medical, and business periodicals, and would
place no new burden on users.240
The Register of Copyrights initially supported the Umbrella Stat-
ute in 1983 because the CCC was having trouble getting on its feet.241
However, in light of the CCC's subsequent growth (along with a with-
drawal of support by the Statute's initial sponsors and its rejection by
the user community), the Register concluded that alternative licensing
systems did not need legislative aid and withdrew support for the stat-
ute in 1988.242 This proposal should be reconsidered, however, be-
cause the CCC needs to increase its number of licensed publications
before it can fully serve the user community.243 Since Texaco indi-
cates that courts will treat the CCC and similar collectives as the pri-
mary vehicle for lawful corporate photocopying, the Umbrella Statute
would be a perfect way to encourage publishers and users to comply
with these new expectations.
Given that the statutory boundaries of fair use photocopying
seem relatively static, it will chiefly be up to the courts to delimit this
developing area of law. In light of Texaco's proposed settlement, it
appears that Supreme Court review is unlikely, and that the Second
Circuit's decision will remain the key precedent on photocopying and
fair use for years to come. Given the Second Circuit's expertise in
copyright law, numerous federal courts, including other circuit courts,
will inevitably apply Texaco's reasoning to future fair use cases.244
Users and publishers can only hope that the courts will be able to
239. Id. at 349. Specifically, the proposal provides that:
[A] publisher who does not enter his works in a licensing system or offer a licens-
ing program risks the loss of injunctive relief, actual damages and lost profits,
statutory damages, attorney fees, and impoundment of the infringing copies or
phonorecords; the criminal infringement remedy is also withdrawn. These reme-
dies are not lost, however, if the user does not participate in a qualified licensing
system .... The scheme therefore encourages both publishers and users to par-
ticipate in certain collective arrangements, but the initial and primary compulsion
is placed on publishers.
Id.
240. Id. at 350.
241. Id. at 350-51.
242. REGISTER'S 1988 REPORT, supra note 18, at 126-27.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 193-206.
244. Second Circuit courts have already cited Texaco with approval in a number of
cases. None of them, however, involved photocopying. See, e.g., Woods v. Bourne Co., 60
F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995) (performance royalties); College Entrance Examination Bd. v.
Pataki, 889 F. Supp. 554 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (standardized tests); Itar-Tass Russian News
Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y 1995) (newspapers); Robinson
v. Random House, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (books).
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strike an equitable balance between copyright dilapidation on one
hand and copyright exploitation on the other.
B. A Preferred Application of Fair Use
In light of its unflagging application since 1976, it appears that.
section 107 is firmly rooted in our judicial system and will remain in
force for decades to come. Although the test itself is unlikely to
change, the approach courts take to the test could benefit from some
modification. Courts need to balance the rights of authors and pub-
lishers with the rapid advance of photocopying technology and the
private sector's need for free exchange of information. Our society
needs a sensitive balance of these constantly fluctuating interests
rather than rigid application of copyright law. Therefore, I respect-
fully offer the following recommendations for future application of
the fair use doctrine to corporate photocopying cases.
First, courts should concentrate more on balancing the four statu-
tory fair use factors. Although most courts pay lip service to Sony's
oft-quoted admonition that fair use is an equitable doctrine requiring
uniform consideration of all four factors,245 most cases, including Tex-
aco, invariably appear to turn on the fourth factor.246 Although the
effect on the market for the original is the most important element of
fair use, courts unconsciously tend to treat it as dispositive. Thus, to
ensure a result that comports with the purpose of the Copyright Act,
courts should make a concerted effort to prevent market effect from
unduly influencing their decisions in fair use cases.
Courts should also strive to remember that the purpose of the
Copyright Act is double-pronged. Although protecting copyright
holders from unauthorized reproduction of original works is essential,
promoting wide dissemination of knowledge by facilitating free access
to it by the public is equally critical.247 Given the immense social ben-
efit derived from scientific research and the fact that photocopying
journal articles significantly aids that research, courts should bear in
mind that the kind of copying presented in Texaco furthers the dis-
semination goal of the Copyright Act. Although researchers should
not be allowed to abuse copyright systematically under the guise of
245. Sony, 464 U.S. at 448.
246. See, e.g., Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177-78; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-68; Sony,
464 U.S. at 454-55.
247. See John Cirace, When does Complete Copying of Copyrighted Works for Purposes
Other Than for Profit or Sale Constitute Fair Use? An Economic Analysis of the Sony
Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases, 28 ST. Louis U. L.J. 647, 650-51 (1984).
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scientific progress, courts need to contemplate the dual purposes of
the Act more than they have in the past.
Another problem is the apparent bias against for-profit defend-
ants that attends some fair use decisions. Given that an abundance of
critical research is performed by private companies, courts need to
remember that commercial profit and social benefit often go hand-in-
hand.24 Blindly favoring research performed by universities and non-
profit agencies is unwise because scientific progress should be en-
couraged regardless of its sponsor. Although no fair use decisions re-
flect outright prejudice against commercial defendants, courts should
be careful to avoid unconscious biases that could impede just
decisions.
Finally, a concern that encompasses all of the foregoing issues is
courts' inattention to fairness as an overriding theme when applying
the fair use doctrine.249 Because section 107 is intended to be an "eq-
uitable rule of reason, 25 ° courts weighing the four factors should ex-
pressly address broad principles of fairness and customary and
accepted practices. For example, in Texaco, the Second Circuit should
have seriously considered Texaco's equitable arguments, or at least
addressed them, instead of simply deferring to the district court's find-
ings. The fact that Dr. Chickering's copies were not sold or distrib-
uted, did not directly profit the company, were produced to further
scientific research, and exemplified a customary practice in the corpo-
rate environment should have been considered cumulatively to judge
the fairness of Texaco's practices. If courts pay more attention to the
fairness theme ingrained in the fair use doctrine, decisions will appear
less rigid and mathematical, and therefore more legitimate.
V
Conclusion
The Texaco decision exemplifies an inherent tension in copyright
law. If all private libraries were permitted to purchase only one origi-
nal and fulfill the demand for numerous copies through systematic
photocopying, the market for copyrighted materials would notably de-
cline. On the other hand, the dissemination of information to both
private and public researchers is vital to scientific progress, and soci-
ety cannot and should not deny the inestimable benefits conferred by
248. Judge Jacobs emphasized the close connection between research and institutions in
his amended dissent filed on July 17, 1995. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 935 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
249. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990).
250. Sony, 471 U.S. at 448.
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photocopying technology. Until now, most private organizations took
a practical approach to reconciling these competing interests and as-
sumed that limited photocopying of journal articles for the sole pur-
pose of personal reference was accepted and permissible. The Second
Circuit, however, has radically challenged these assumptions.
In applying the fair use doctrine to the Texaco case, the Second
Circuit analyzed the four statutory factors in accordance with control-
ling fair use precedent. In this light, the decision is legally correct.
However, since Williams & Wilkins in 1973, no cases have addressed
the unique questions surrounding limited photocopying of journal ar-
ticles for research purposes. These new issues presented in Texaco
demanded individual, equitable consideration rather than the Second
Circuit's rigid application of distinguishable fair use precedent. Thus,
although it is a legally defensible opinion, the Texaco court erred in
many equitable respects.
Regarding policy concerns, the Texaco decision thwarts a major
purpose of the Copyright Act because it hinders authors' primary in-
centive to publish-dissemination of their work to fellow colleagues.
Also, the court did not adequately consider the extremely widespread,
reasonable, and customary nature of Dr. Chickering's photocopying.
Finally, because research is one of the statutory definitions of fair use,
the court erred in focusing on the ultimate commercial goal of Texaco
instead of the immediate research purpose of the photocopies.
More specifically, the Texaco court placed too much reliance on
the assumed capabilities of the CCC without fully exploring its practi-
cal worth. Closer factual scrutiny confirms that although the CCC en-
courages copyright compliance and has increased its breadth of
service over the years, the system has not yet expanded to a level
where it can meet fully the photocopying demands of all of corporate
America. Thus, the Second Circuit's exaggerated dependence on the
CCC is unjustified and undermines the legitimacy of the Texaco
decision.
Although Texaco offers some fairly narrow and impractical alter-
natives, the decision leaves private organizations that rely on photo-
copying little choice but to enroll with the CCC (or a similar
collective) or risk infringement liability. Whether this case represents
the trend of the future or is simply a temporary remedy will largely
depend on future litigation and the development of copyright collec-
tives. One thing that is certain, however, is that corporate employees
will now be forced to think about a lot more than their lunch plans
when they approach the office photocopy machine.
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